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Rotten Social Background Revisited
Mythri A. Jayaraman*
L IaiaiXn
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that
"cruel and unusual punishments" may not be inflicted.1 To ensure that this
constitutional mandate is fulfilled, the convicted capital defendant's sentence
must be narrowlytailored in such a waythat punishment is individualized to that
particular defendant. According to the United States Supreme Court, included
in the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments is the require-
ment that sentencing bodies consider mitigating factors individual to each capital
defendant Although one's socioeconomic status and childhood upbringing
have a significant effect on one's behavior and value system, there is still much
dispute between defense and prosecution attorneys, as well as among judges, as
to what role these factors should playin the context of a criminal trial. Recently,
in WM= ia v Talor, the United States Supreme Court helped to clarifythis issue
by declaring that a defendant has a constitutionally guaranteed right to present
evidence during the sentencing phase of his capital murder trial of his "nightmar-
ish" childhood, as well as evidence that he has border-line mental retardation."
II. History qC"Rcten Soial Badeg -United States v. Alexander
Rotten Social Background evidence consists of evidence of the defendant's
childhood, including squalor, abuse, abandonment, and alcoholism. Judge
Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia first
raised the idea of using Rotten Social Background evidence as a defense in his
* JD. Candiate, May 2003, Washington & Lee University School of Law, B.S.,
University of Oklahoma. Special thanks to myparents for pushing me, to Professor Roger D.
Groot for pulling me, and to Janet Roof for doing neither.
1. US. Cbr' . amend. VIII.
2. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397 (2000) (holding that the defendant had a valid
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where defendant's attorney failed to present evidence of his
troubled childhood during sentencing phase of capital murder tria; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
607 (1978) (explaining that the jury should not be prevented from considering any evidence the
defendant profers regarding his character or record as a mitigating factor).
3. 529 US. 362 (2000).
4. W'diam, 529 US. at 395.
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dissent in UnedStas v Aloacre s in 1972.6 Judge Bazelon expanded upon the
"Rotten Social Background," first used by the defense psychiatrist, to describe
conditions of socioeconomic and environmental adversity.7 In A kaer, the
defendant, Murdock, shot and killed a Marine after the Marine called the defen-
dant a "black bastard."8 Although the defense psychiatrist would not label
Murdockinsane, the psychiatrist testified that Murdock suffered froman inability
to control his behavior because of his "rotten social background."9 The defense
presented evidence showing that the defendant had suffered from a deprived
childhood in the Watts area of Los Angeles, California, and that because he had
been subjected to racist treatment in the past, he had learned to fear white
people.10 However, the trial judge instructed the jury to consider only whether
Murdock's state of mind met the legal standard for insanity.11 The judge also
instructed the jury to disregard testimony about Murdock's "rotten social back-
ground." 2 The juryfound the defendant sane and sentenced himto twentyyears
to life in prison.13
In his dissent, Judge Bazelon proposed that the trial judge's rejection of
Rotten Social Background evidence may have resulted in an unfair trial for the
defendant because the defendant 'was not able to use this evidence to show he
lacked moral responsibility for the murder.14 Judge Bazelon suggested that,
although the defendant's mental impairment was not severe enough to render
him insane, the jury might have acquitted him after hearing all of the evidence of
his background." Judge Bazelon also suggested that, by allowing this type of
background evidence into trials, the court would be accepting its "first-line
5. 471 F2d 923 (D.C CAr. 1973).
6. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923,961 (D.C Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting)
(stating in his dissent that the juryshould have been allowed to consider evidence of the defendants
troubled childhood).
7. Id at 959.
8. Id at 929.
9. Id at 958-59. There are several tests for the insanity defense. Virgi ia employs the
M'Naghten test, which states that the defendant must show that at the time of the offense he was
suffering from a defect of reason caused bya disease of mind, such that he did not know the nature
and consequences of his act, or that it was wrong. S& Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867,
878 (1881); sw MNa/gnba's Ge, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (IL 1843). Under the Model Penal Code's test,
insanity is proven by showing that, because of the defendant's mental disease or impairment, he
lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE 5 4.01(1) (Official Draft 1985).
10. Alecand, 471 F.2d at 958-59.
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id at 927.
14. Id at 960.
15. A aleczie, 471 F.2d at 958-59.
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responsibility for probing and coping" with various societal problems such as
racism.
16
IIL ReaigRten Said Ba&g undas a D se
To understand the role Rotten Social Background evidence might playin a
capital case, it is important to think about the basic structure of the criminal
system. A crime is "an act or omission and its accompanying state of mind
which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pro-
nouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.' 7 When one's
mental state and actions fulfill certain statutorilyproscribed elements of a particu-
lar crime, he has committed a criminal offense. However, unless the defendant
is morallyblameworthy, criminal sanctions are usuallynot applicable. 8 If there
are "defenses" that may negate criminal responsibility, these must be taken into
consideration in order to determine what, if any, sanctions are appropriate.
There are four broad types of defenses.19 Justification defenses refer to behavior
which, because of the particular circumstances, is socially acceptable rather than
criminal.2" Self-defense is one type of justification defense. A second type of
defense is the specialized defense, such as "abandonment" or "legal impossibil-
ity," which applies to only a few crimes.2' Nonexculpatorydefenses are based on
considerations unrelated to the defendant's guilt or innocence, such as statutes
of limitation, diplomatic immunity, and infancy.22 Excuse defenses, on the other
hand, acknowledge that while the conduct was wrongful, the defendant is not
morally blameworthy.' Excuse defenses can be used to negate or mitigate
criminal liability" One such defense is the insanity excuse."
In 1985, Richard Delgado wrote an article that examined the viability of
using Rotten Social Background as a defense.26 In his article, Delgado focused
16. Se id at 926 (stating that "[w)e cannot rationally decry crime and brutality and racial
animosity without at the same time struggling to enhance the fairness and integrity of the criminal
justice system").
17. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRtMINAL LAW S 1.01 (2d ed. 1995) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Henry1M Hart, Jr., 7heA um jfdxGirx1La-M 23 LAW& CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 405 (1958)).
18. Id
19. Id at 182-84.
20. Id at 182-83.
21. Id at 183-84.
22. SeePaul Robinson, Crin!LawDfis: A SswrmicA nzyis, 82 OLUN? L. REV. 199,
229-32 (1982) (stating that nonexculpatorydefenses are based on "purelypublic policy arguments"
rather than on the defendant's innocence).
23. Id
24. SeR. Kent Greenawalt, Videw-L.4 jsiaminardModApp dsa 32 EMORYLJ. 437,
442 (1983) (stating that although a defendant's actions were wrong, he may not be morally blame-
worthy because of "notions of social moraliy").
25. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRUMINAL LAW S 16.03 (2d ed. 1995).
26. Richard Delgado, Rcom Scrd Badkgtunx" Should dx Ginind LawReagiie a Dte cf
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primarily on the excuse defense, in which the defendant admits to committing
the offense, but contends that his blameworthiness is diminished byan excusing
factor." Delgado argued that a defendant who has had a Rotten Social
Background may not be subjectively at fault; thus his behavior should be ex-
cused.28
Using Rotten Social Background as a defense treads veryclose to the use of
many other "abuse excuse" defenses. These defenses seek to excuse the behav-
ior of a victim toward the victimizer 9 These excuses are often dubbed "syn-
drome" excuses, and they rely on an extrapolation from the general to the
specific.3 Syndromes may be traced to physical and psychological causes, and
have predictable effects on behavior, so that experts can identify and label those
who suffer from the syndrome.31
"Syndrome" defenses require the juryto hear evidence about how members
of a certain group (battered women, victims of child abuse, urban dwellers, etc.)
typically act, and then determine if the iri defendant indeed does belong
to that group. 2 If the jury finds that the defendant belongs to that group,
through deductive reasoning, it should find that the defendant has no moral
responsibility for his crime. However, juries often are reluctant to accept such
defenses, and courts ordinarily hesitate to allow juries to hear this type of evi-
dence.33 Being an adult victim of abuse, by itself, does not unduly impair one's
moral capacities. Nor does victimhood preclude victimizing. Indeed, judges
have traditionally held that evidence pertaining to the defendant's social back-
ground, such as povertyor abuse, is irrelevant to the issue of moral blameworthi-
ness.
34
Under existing law, only defendants with severe disabilities are not held
accountable for their crimes. To be acquitted of a criminal offense requires the
defendant to meet the very high standard of showing that his actions were not
Sece Eminn DTliuuiai, 3 LAw &INEQ.J. 9 (1985).
27. Id at 16.
28. Id at 23-24.
29. SeeRobert P. Mosteler, S yrhvm aridPditia inCtiniml Th ialarEtideuwLav 46 DUKE
LJ. 461, 465 (1996) (stating that "abuse excuses" are only sometimes successful because of our
"ambivalent attitudes toward self-help violence").
30. Id at 463.
31. Id
32. SeeJOSHUADRESSLERL NDERSTANDINGQUIMINALLAW§18.06(2ded. 1995) (explain-
ing that in the typical "battered woman syndrome" case, the defense introduces evidence that the
defendant subjectively believed she was in danger, and that this belief was objectively reasonable
for a person who is suffering from battered woman syndrome).
33. Peter Arenella, Dwe s g drztseExoae Is T"e O?, 19 HARV.JL.&PUB.POLY
703,704 (1996) (stating that the only abuse excuse for which a defendant may use evidence of past
victimization to negate legal responsibility is the insanity defense).
34. Id
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"voluntary," and that thus, he should not be held criminally responsible."
Rather, it is more common to find cases in which the defendant uses evidence
of a rotten social background and early childhood trauma to lessen, rather than
fully negate, his criminal responsibility' Therefore, although it may be difficult
to meet the standard for insanity, which is a full defense, it maybe possible for
the defendant to rely on a partial defense, such as "heat of passion," to mitigate
the defendant's culpability for the charged offense37 These "imperfect" or"partial defenses do not act in the same wayas "abuse excuses" because theydo
not purport to negate the defendant's blameworthiness.
Using Rotten Social Background as a defense strategy is risky because the
defendant must be able to show that his background was so bad that it actually
negates an element of the offense, therebyremoving anyculpability. Because the
requirements to prove insanity and other total excuse defenses are so high, and
because judges are loathe to admit evidence concerning the defendant's social
background during the guilt/innocence stage of a trial, this standard rarely will
be met. 9 It would be verydifficult to convince a jurythat the defendant should
not be found guilty of a heinous murder because he grew up in poverty and
abuse.
IV. Rottm Sodal BadgtndAs a Mitgator
Virginia has a bifurcated approach to capital murder trials.4 Under this
system, the jury is first called upon to determine if the defendant is guilty.' If,
after this phase of trial, the defendant is found guilty, the jurythen will proceed
to the sentencing phase of the trial. 2 In this phase, if the jury has convicted the
defendant of capital murder, the jury may choose only between sentencing the
35. SeeDelgado, s"pa note 26, at 38.
36. Id at43.
37. Arenela, s"qm note 33, at 704.
38. Id
39. Id at 705.
40. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2.-264.3(A), (Q (Mlchie 2000).
41. S 19.2-264.3(A).
42. VA. CODE ANL S 19.2-264.4(A) (Mlchie 2000). Section 192-264.4(A) states:
Upon a finding that the defendant is dlyof an offense which maybe punishable by
death, a proceedin shal be held w* shall be limited to a dterination as to
whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life onmen .... In case
of trial by jury, where a sentence of death is not recomnmende, the defendant shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for life.
2002]
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defendant to life in prison without parole or sentencing him to death.3 Virginia
Code Section 19.2-264.2 states that:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for
which the death penqaltymay be imposed, a sentence of death shall not
be imposed unless the court orjuryshall (1) after consideration of the
past ciiminal record of convictions of the defendant, find that there is
a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or
[that the offense was vile]; and (2) recommend that the penalty of
death be imposed- "
Section 192-264.4(C) states that a defendant maynot be sentenced to death until
the Commonwealth has proven either the future dangerousness aggravator orthe
vileness aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. However, even if the jurydoes
find one or both of the aggravators, it is not required to impose death."
In determining whether a life or death sentence is appropriate, the jury is
required under Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4(B) to consider evidence offered
in mitigation by the defendant." This section states that:
Evidence which may be admissible subject to the rules of evidence
governing admissibility, may include the circumstances surrounding
the offense, the history and background of the defendant, and any
other facts in mitigation of the offense. Facts in mitination may
include, but shall not be limited to, the following: (i the defendant hais
no significant history of prior criminal activity (ii the capital felony
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance, (i) the victim was a artdci-
pant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act, (ivY at the
time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminalty of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, (v)
the age of the defendant at the time of the conmission of the capital
offense, or (vi) mental retardation of the defendant.48
This section divides mitigating evidence broadly into either evidence pertaining
to the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense that somehow make the
defendant less morally blameworthyor the personal characteristics of the defen-
43. Sa id; see also VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Mchie 1994) (stat that [any person
sentenced to a term of incarceration for a felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995,
shall not be eligible for parole upon that offense"); VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-40.01 (Mfichie 1994)
(stating that geriatric prisoners convicted of a Class 1 felonyoffense committed on or after January
1, 1995 are not eligible for parole).
44. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-2642 (Nlchie 2000).
45. VA. CODE ANN.5 192-264.4(C) (fichie 2000) (providing that death penatymaynot be
imposed unless Commonwealth proves aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt).
46. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4 (Michie 2000).
47. VA. CODE ANN. 519.2-264.4(B) (Mchie 2000).
48. Id
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dant that somehow lessen the defendant's moral culpability. Rotten Social
Background, as a mitigator, fits squarely within the latter category, particularly
within subsections (i) and (iv) of the statute. A history of poverty, abandon-
ment, and abuse, while not sufficient to absolutelynegate culpability, still maybe
sufficient to convince a potential juror that the defendant is less morallyculpable.
The idea of using a "syndrome" as an excuse is very different from using
Rotten Social Background to mitigate a sentence. "Syndrome" evidence supports
"a claim that ... it has significant and predictable effects on perceptions or
behaviors, or that experts can accurately identify individuals who fit within its
boundaries."49 This type of "group character" evidence suggests that Rotten
Social Background can be used to show that people who fall into a particular
group generally act in a particular way. ° Syndrome evidence is generally ex-
cluded, with very few exceptions (such as Battered Women's Syndrome).s"
In Jerkim u CQrm wad, 2 the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the
defendant's capital murder conviction and death sentence for the killing of his
uncle, despite proffered evidence showing that the defendant suffered from
"child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome."" In Jenhnm, the defendant
sought to admit evidence during the guilt phase of his trial fromhis former Child
Protective Services worker showing that he had been physically and sexually
abused as a child.' The defendant testified that he was "angry" at his familyfor
the abuse he suffered at their hands as a child, and had planned to kill his uncle."
Because there was "uncontradicted evidence" that the defendant's actions had
been premeditated and deliberate, the court concluded that the uncle's homicide
was committed, as a matter of law, with malice aforethought, and therefore,
evidence proffered to prove manslaughter was not admissible.' When the
defendant argued that such evidence should have been permitted during the
penalty phase, the court found that this contention had been procedurally
defaulted."7 On habeas corpus review, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Crcuit found that the evidence of the defendant's "childhood sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome" was insufficient to find him not guilty.58
49. Mosteller, s"pm note 29, at 463.
50. Id
51. SeDRESSLER, s"~r note 32; sw also Mosteller, s"ma note 29, at 466.
52. 423 S.E.2d 360 (Va. 1992).
53. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E2d 360,367-71 (Va. 1992) (stating that evidence of
the defendant's childhood sexual abuse was not admissible because it was insufficient to find him
not guilt).
54. Id at 367-68.
55. Id at 368.
56. Id
57. Id at 369.
58. Jenkins v. Angelone, 168 F.3d 482 (4th CGr. 1999), audiaHeat No. 98-13, 1999 WL 9944,
at *6 (4th Cr. Jan. 12, 1999).
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Even though syndrome evidence cannot be used to negate culpabilityduring
the guilt phase of trial, defense attorneys may use Rotten Social Background
evidence under Virginia Code Section 192-264.4(B) to badiJid the sentence
to a particular defendant based on that particular defendant's childhood, history,
and environmental background." Thus, one maymake a plausible argument that
such evidence would have been appropriate in Jen&vz during the sentencing
phase of trial under Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) to mitigate the
defendant's sentence from death to life in prison.
In Pa * v Ca mmua4bh' the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that
evidence of the defendant's mental condition, short of insanity; could not be
admitted.6 1 In PeeS, the defendant claimed that he shot the victim in self-
defense after an oral disagreement over the sale of marijuana.' The defendant
sought to admit testimonial evidence from a psychologist that because of his mild
mental retardation and "the particular waythat [his] mind [was] affected," he had
difficulty in perceiving social situations correctly.63 The defendant contended
that he acted in the heat of passion and out of self-defense." The court stated
that this evidence was properly excluded during the guilt phase of the trial,
because it did not show a "reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury."'
The objective facets of the defendant's self-defense and heat of passion claims
could not be met by introducing evidence of the defendant's subjective percep-
tion of events. 6
As in Jektm, however, it is possible that this evidence would have been
admitted as mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase under Virginia Code
Section 19.2-264.4(B)(u). This subsection, which allows the defendant to present
evidence of his subjective state of mind, is not limited bythe objective standards
applicable in the guilt phase of the triaL67 One justly may ask whether the mere
fact that someone succumbed to early childhood traumas should affect the
calculation of what he deserves in the sphere of criminal justice. Richard
Delgado wrote that "[d]efendants who have grown up in socially deprived
environments do not have the same chances to absorb the majority's legal and
moral norms."" Although evidence of a defendant's deprived environment may
not be admissible to excuse fullythe defendant's actions and find him not guilty,
59. VA. QODE ANN. S 19.-264.4(B) (Mluchie 2000).
60. 519 S.-2d 382 (Va. C. App. 1999).
61. Peeples v. Comnonweath, 519 SE.2d 382,383 (Va. CL. App. 1999) (en banc) (stating
that the defendant could not present evidence of his mental condition to support a claim of heat




65. Id at 386.
66. SeeiA
67. See VA. (WOE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B)(Ca (Mchie 2000).
68. Delgado, spr note 26, at 38.
334 [Vol. 14:2
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evidence of such a background may show that the defendant had an impaired
condition of mind that affected his emotional and behavioral processes at the
time of the offense, therebycalling for a lesser penaky' To this extent, defense
attorney must present evidence to show how a Rotten Social Background
affected the defendant's condition of mind.
V. Pkziaz United Sta" Spmm Qit R6iV
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly found that capital defen-
dants have a constitutional right to present evidence in mitigation during sentenc-
ing.7o The Court has stated that mitigating evidence may include evidence
pertaining to the defendant's background." In Lakaeu v cjio/n the Court held
that the Ohio death penakystatute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments because it did not permit the type of individualized consideration of
mitigating factors required bythe Constitution The Ohio death penaltystatute
only allowed the juryto consider three types of mitigating evidence: whether the
victim "induced or facilitated" the offense, whether the defendant acted under
duress or coercion, and whether the offense was primarily the product of the
defendant's mental deficiency 4 The Court found that these three mitigators did
not sufficientlyallowthe juryto hear evidence that could mitigate against a death
penalty because it did not allow for consideration of factors such as age or the
role the defendant plyed in the offense."
Rather, "the sentencer [must] not be preclude from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death."7 The plurality of the Court stated that the Ohio death penalty
statute was unconstitutional because it restricted the range of mitigating circum-
stances that could be considered by the sentencing body.n
69. SaVA. 0ODE ANN. S 191-264.4(B)Cu), (iv) (Michie 2000).
70. SwLockett v. Ohio,438 US. 586,608 (1978); Eddings v. Olahoma,455 U.S. 104,113-
14 (1982); Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302, 318 (1989).
71. SePenzyv. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302,318 (1989) (holding that the jurymust be instructed
that it could give mitigating effect to evidence of the defendant's mental condition and history of
abuse).
72. 438 US. 586 (1978).
73. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US. 586,604(1978) (pluray opinionof Buger, C.) (explaining
that in all but the rarest kind of capital case, [the juz] may not be precluded from considerig
,anyaspect of a defendant's character or record and anyof the circumstance of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death) (emphasis in original).
74. Id at 607; ser OHIO REV. OJDE ANN. S 2929.04(B) (West 1979).
75. Loedt, 438 US. at 608.
76. Id at 604.
77. Id at 608.
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The Court reaffirmed the constitutional right to present any relevant
mitigating factors for consideration in Edds v OMbn 7, in which the Court
held that, just as a state may not enact legislation that prevents the sentencer
from considering mitigating factors, the sentencer also cannot refuse to consider
any relevant mitigating evidence." Because the defendant was onlysixteen years
old when he committed the offense, the Court stated that evidence of his back-
ground of abuse was particularlyrelevant in dwtamadar ae. ° Eddi might be
limited bythe Court's statement that, because of his age, the defendant was more
susceptible to the effects of abuse. However, reading Lodeett and Eddr to-
gether, it appears that, while the sentencing body (whether judge or jury) may
give mitigating evidence whatever weight it chooses, it maynot absolutely refuse
to consider the mitigating evidence.
The right of the defendant to present any relevant mitigating circumstances
and the responsibility of the jury to consider the mitigating evidence would not
mean anything unless the sentencer could give effect to that evidence. In Pemy
v Lywo, the Court held that executing people with mental retardation does
not violate the Eighth Amendment. 2 However, the Court continued, the jury
must be instructed that it could consider and give effect to the mitigating effect
of the defendant's mental retardation and history of abuse so that the jury may
express its "reasoned moral response" to this mitigating evidence. 3 The Court
recognized that, in order to uphold the underlying principles of Loeert and
Eddi , the jurymust have the abilityto give effect to mitigating circumstances. 4
This would be the only way to ensure that the punishment is directly related to
the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.
V. Rottae Saiad Ba&gmurdEde xr as a COm ifdcw Made -
7be Willams Hddirg
Recently, the issue of using Rotten Social Background as .a mitigator to a
death sentence came before the United States Supreme Court in Wlliam v
Taor."8 In this case, the Court held that the defendant, Terry Williams, had a
valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the defense attomeydid not
78. 455 US. 104 (1982).
79. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 US. 104, 113-14 (1982) (stating that the trial judge errone-
ously refused to consider mitigating evidence of the defendant's violent family history).
80. I at 115.
81. 492 US. 302 (1989).
82. Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302,318 (1989) (holding that the jurymust be instructed that
it could give mitigating effect to evidence of the defendant's mental condition and historyof abuse);
swalso ReplyBr. for Pet'r at *7, Atkins v. Vrginia, No. 00-8452,2002 WL 225883 (US. Feb. 12,
2002) (arguing that an Eighth Amendment rule prohibiting the execution of all persons who suffer
from mental retardation is both necessary and appropriate").
83. Pen) 492 US. at 318.
84. Id at 318.
85. WIliams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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investigate or present evidence of Williams's history of abuse, commitment in
various foster homes, squalor, or border-line mental retardation . 6 This suggests
that the defendant has a constitutional right to present evidence of Rotten Social
Background, a right that is so fundamental that for an attorneynot to present it
is the constitutional equivalent of not even having an attorney at all.
On November 3, 1985, Harris Thomas Stone ("Stone") was found dead at
his home."7 Other than his missing wallet, there was no sign of any physical
struggle, and the medical examiner who examined Stone's body concluded that
he had died of heart failure. The examiner later amended the cause of death to
alcohol poisoning, after it was found that Stone's blood alcohol content was
.41%." About six months later, Terry Williams ("Williams") sent a letter to
Danville's chief of police, in which he admitted to killing Stone." William later
confessed to murdering and robbing Stone.'0 Williams confessed that when
Stone refused to give him his money, he struck Stone on the chest and back with
a mattock 9' When Stone's body was exhumed and an autopsy was performed,
it was discovered that Stone had two broken ribs and his left lung had been
punctured.
2
On September 30, 1986, a jury convicted Williams of capital murder."
During the ensuing sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found the future
dangerousness aggravator, and recommended that Williams should be given the
death penalty." Williams's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia and his petition for a writ of certiorari was denied'bythe
United States Supreme Court'
Thereafter, Williams began his collateral attack on his conviction. He filed
a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and, after a hearing, most of his
claims were dismissed.'7 In 1996, Williams amended his petition for habeas
corpus, this time including several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."
Pursuant to Virginia Code Section 8.01- 654(q (1), the Supreme Court of Virginia
assumed jurisdiction, although it asked for the circuit court's findings of fact and
86. Id at 395-96.
87. Id at 367.
88. W'iams v. Commonweah, 360 S.E2d 361, 363 (Va. 1987).
89. Id at 363-64.
90. Id at 364.
91. W&m, 529 US. at 367-68.
92. Wfifim, 360 S.E.2d at 364.
93. Id at 363.
94. WzId ,rn, 529 US. at 370.
95. Id; sw Wili rn, 360 S.E.2d at 371, wt e* Williams v. Virginia, 484 US. 1020 (1988).
96. Wdia, 360 SXE.2d at 371.
97. Wdtiarm, 529 US. at 372.
98. Id at 371.
2002]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
legal recommendations." The circuit court reported to the Supreme Court of
Virginia that, although the conviction was valid, the sentence was not because
iliams's attomeydid not present evidence of Williams's background as mitigat-
ing evidence during the sentencing phase.1°
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the circuit court's conten-
tion after applying the Sthick andtest for prejudice.101 The Supreme Court of
Virginia decided that there was no reasonable probability that the jury would
have handed down a sentence other than death, even if the defendant had
presented mitigating evidence of his social upbringing, I.Q. level, and back-
ground-L1
02
At this point, Williams filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under 28
US.C S 2254.1'3 The federal district court agreed with the Virginia circuit court;
it found that the defendant's attorney had erred by not presenting evidence
showing that Williams had been a "good" prisoner (i.e., was not a danger), that
he had helpedto break up a drug operation in prison, that he had been abused
by his father, that he had mild mental retardation, and that his childhood home
had been grossly unhygienic."4 The district court held that the Supreme Court
of Virginia had acted "contraryto" federal law, and had applied federal lawin an
"unreasonable" way."~ The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit disagreed with the district court, and found that the Supreme Court of
Virginia had not applied the SrkLvri standard in an unreasonable way."°
According to the Fourth Circuit, the evidence of Williams's future dangerousness
was so overwhelming that he was notpreudiced bythe omission of the mitigat-
ing evidence of his rotten backgroundW
99. Se VA. CODE ANN. 5 8.01-654(q(1) (Milchie 2000) (stating that -[w]idi respect to [a
habeas] petition filed by petitioner held under the sentence of death... the Supreme Court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to consider and award writs of habeas corpus").
100. Wiam, 529 US. at 371.
101. SeSricldand v. Washington, 466 US. 668,694 (1984) (holding that the defendant has
not suffered prejudice unless it is reasonably probable that the result of the trial would have been
different if it were not for counsels mistakes.
102. W/ims, 529 US. at 372.
103. Id;swaso28 US.C S 2254 (Supp. V 1999).
104. WdUmz, 529 US. at 395. Records of Williams's home when he was a juvenile described:
[fhe home was] a co.mplete wrec... There were several places on the floor wheresomeone had had a bowel movement Urine was sanpl h
bedooms. There were dtdishes scatred over the ad it weas
to step any lace on the itcen floor where there was no tras... h nhd
.to be put imslow Hospital, as four of them... were definitely under the influence
of wzskey.
ld at 395 n.19.
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W'liams again petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari"' This time, the Supreme Court granted his petition and ultimately
reversed Williams's sentence and remanded to the trial court for a new sentenc-
ing proceeding.'"' The United States Supreme Court found that Wliams's
petition for habeas corpus indeed did fal under S 2254(d)(1), because the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, during direct review, had acted "contraryto... clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States."' A bulk of the Court's decision dealt with the proper standard for
review in federal habeas proceedings."' Although that issue is not directly
implicated here, it is important to note that the Court held that a writ of habeas
corpus may only be granted if the state court's decision was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, a rule of law established bythe Supreme
Court."2 The Court applied the test under Sti' Vdr/a WazhiSd to determine
whether Williams could succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim."4
In order to satisfythe StuidL/dtest, the defendant must show. (1) that counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of
prevailing professional norms; and (2) that he was prejudiced by the ineffective
assistance of counseL"' In order to showprejudice, the defendant is required to
show that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different.'
1 6
The Court held that the Supreme Court of Virginia, in holding that Williams
was not prejudiced byhis counsel's failure to investigate and introduce evidence
regarding his childhood, had acted "contrary to" the clearly established federal
law of Styi&klnidH7 The Court stated that, for purposes of S2254(d) (1), a finding
that the state court had acted "contraryto," or had unreasonablyapplied, clearly
established federal law would require more than a mere determination that the
federal court would have decidecf differently from the state court' The Court
noted that reversing a state decision on a habeas attack is more difficult than on
108. Williams v. Taylor, 526 US. 1050 (1999) (mem.).
109. M/ars, 529 US. at 399.
110. 28 US.C S 2254(d)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
111. iVdnims, 529 US. at 402-16.
112. Id
113. 466 US. 668 (1984).
114. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that in order for a
defendant to show that he was prejudiced bythe ineffective assistance of his counsel, he must show
that there is a reasonable probabilitythat his counsels errors led to a different outcome of the trial).
115. Id
116. Id at 694.
117. M'dmiwm, 529 US. at 397.
118. See id at 409-10 (stating that an unreasonable application of federal law is not the same
as an incorrect application of federal law, and that the inquuyinto whether the state court unreason-
ably applied federal law should be objeive).
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direct appeal.19 This makes it even more impressive that the Supreme Court
reversed Williams's sentence, even under the heightened scrutiny. Wz=ian,
Lck&e and EddirV, read together, stand for the proposition that in order to meet
the defendant's Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the jury mMt
be given mitigating evidence of a defendant's Rotten Social Background in order
to determine properly which sentence is appropriate.
VII. The aDc*Edg~e S rwd
After Wiliam, it appears that the criminal defendant has a constitutionally
protected right to present evidence of his Rotten Social Background during the
sentencing phase as a mitigator against the death penalty. However, this evidence
must not be allowed to become an instrument for the prosecution to strengthen
its case. There are four predominant reasons for doling out criminal punish-
ments: (1) rehabilitation; (2) retribution; (3) general deterrence; and (4) to protect
societythrough specific deterrence.12 The fourth reason for punishing criminal
perpetrators, the desire to protect our society, may be served by sentencing a
defendant who had a horrible childhood to death. The argument supporting
death sentences for these defendants is that if a defendant has such a skewed
perception of social mores, and has such difficulty conforming his behavior
because of his past victimization of abuse, poverty, or mental retardation, there
is nothing to keep him from repeating this heinous act. If the defendant does
not understand fully the wrongfulness of his actions, and if there will be no
deterrent effect, nothing will prevent him from committing the same offenses
again. Thus, the prosecution potentiallycould use the veryRotten Social Back-
ground evidence the defendant presents in mitigation to prove the future danger-
ousness aggravator. Justice O'Connor commented on this dilemma in Pmy,
when she wrote that "Penry's mental retardation and history of abuse is thus a
two-edged sword: it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it
indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future."'
In Eddi, the Court held that it was within the jury's discretion how much
weight was to be accorded to the mitigating evidence presented by the
defendant.' However, the Court held that the jury could not choose to give
such mitigating evidence nov eibyrefusing to consider such evidence." Based
on this rationale, it may be argued that the prosecution should not be allowed to
turn the defendant's mitigating evidence against the defendant to prove future
dangerousness because using such evidence to prove an aggravating factor for
the prosecution would be even more detrimental than allowing the jury to give
the mitigating evidence no consideration at all.
119. Id at 408-09.
120. JOSHUADRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING QuMINAL LAWS 2.03 (2d ed. 1995).
121. Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989).
122. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982).
123. Id at 115.
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In presenting its mitgation case under Virginia Code Section 19.2-
264.4 (A) (ii) or (iv), the defendant willlikelyuse mitigation and psychiatric experts
to testify about the defendant's mental condition and childhood environment.2"
The prosecution may use the evidence, including the defendant's statements,
from these reports to rebut the issues the defendant presents in mitigation, but
may not use such evidence to prove an issue, such as future dangerousness,
which the defendant does not raise in his mitigation case. Further support for
this proposition is provided by the very Language of Virginia Code Section 192-
264.3:1(G), which prohibits the use of any "evidence derived from any such
statements or disclosures [made by a defendant to be introduced] against the
defendant at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial for the purpose of
proving the aggravating circumstances specified in Section 19.2-264.4. " "'s In
other words, the Commonwealth maynot use disclosures made bythe defendant
during psychiatric or competency evaluations to prove future dangerousness.
While the prosecutor may argue, based on all of the evidence presented at trial,
that the defendant constitutes a future danger, she may not use the defendant's
statements or disclosures from the actual reports to prove any other element or
aggravator.
However, it is important to note that this statute also forbids the prosecu-
tion from using any evidence garnered from evaluations pursuant to Virginia
Code Section 19.2- 169.1 or Section 192-169.5 and 192-264.3:1, except to rebut
issues the defendant raises in mitigation."' Section 192-169.1 deals with a
competency evaluation; Section 19.2-169.5 deals with evaluations performed to
determine sanity at the time of the offense.127 Under the statute, the Common-
wealth may use the information fathered from these evaluations to rebut the
defendant's mitigating evidence. The prosecution may use this evidence only
to show that the defendant's purported mitigator does not exist. For example,
if the defendant, after undergoing an evaluation, seeks to present evidence inmitigation that shows that he suffers from fetal alcohol syndrome due to his
alcoholic mother, who drank when she was pregnant, the prosecution may only
use the evidence from this evaluation to rebut the assertion that the defendant
does, in fact, suffer from fetal alcohol syndrome. The prosecutor may use the
information to rebut the actual issue being presented as mitigation, but she may
not use this evidence to prove future dangerousness.
In determining whether the prosecution is rebutting the defendant's mitiga-
tion case, one should look at the function, instead of the source, of the
124. VA. GODE ANN. 5 192-264.4 (Michie 2000).
125. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-2643:1(G) (Michie 2000).
126. Id
127. VA. GODE ANN. S 192-169.1 (Michie 2000); VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-169.5 (Mhcbi 2000).
128. VA. GODE ANN. S 19.2-2643:1(G) (Mhk 2000).
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evidence!" If the defendant proffers evidence from a psychiatric evaluation
simply to mitigate a death sentence, it is not permissibe for the prosecution to
use this psychiatric evidence to prove future dangerousness. The onlywaythe
prosecution may use this psychiatric evidence against the defendant is if the
defendant himself proffers it as anti-future dangerousness evidence. If the
defendant uses Rotten Social Background evidence only as a statutory mitigator,
it does not attack the Commonwealth's future dangerousness evidence. Mitiga-
tion can be analogized to a confession-and-avoidance defense. The defendant's
mitigation evidence does not challenge the existence of the aggravator. Rather,
it seeks a life sentence despite the aggravator. If the Commonwealth tries to re-
prove future dangerousness using the defendant's evidence, it goes beyond the
scope of the defendant's case in mitigation. This is prohibited under Virginia
Code Section 19.2-264.3:1(G).'-
VIII. Pcsside 0 amwv 0n Comm
Although Wdl held that there is a constitutional requirement to present
mitigating evidence of a defendant's Rotten Social Background, a question that
remains is how to present this evidence. Prosecutors can no longer make an
objection to the introduction of such evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant,
because such evidence has been deemed constitutionally relevant. 13 1 Therefore,
prosecutors can onlymake technical evidentiaryobjections. Most of this mitigat-
ing evidence will necessarily be in the form of hearsay. Typically, a witness, such
as a mitigation expert or Child Protective Services worker, will offer testimony
about what others have told her regarding events that happened years, if not
decades, ago. It is likelythat prosecutors will object to the introduction of such
testimony. However, it is important to note that evidentiary rules are more
relaxed at the sentencing phase than at the guilt phase.' Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court has held that if there is evidence that has anytendencyto
129. Failure to make this distinction between function and source is exemplified byVinson
v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 170, 178 (Va. 1999). During the penalty phase in V/mnc, the
defendant's e di expert testified about the defendant's mental condition and offered excuses for
the defendant's behavior, but did not directly argue against future dangerousness. I Despite
defendant's objections, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to present expert testimony
regarding the defendant's future dangerousness. Id The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the
conviction and death sentence, stating that the trial court properly alloved the prosecutor to
present evidence in rebuttal regarding the probability of defendant's future behavior." Id
130. VA. 0)0 ANN. S 191-264.3:1(G) (Mlichie 2000).
131. Williams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362,397 (2000).
132. S Green v. Georgia, 442 US. 95,97 (1979) (per curianm (noting that "[r]egardless of
whether the proffered testimony comes within Georgia's hearsay rule, under the facts of this case
its exclusion constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment..
.[because the] testimony was highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase").
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establish a mitigating fact, it nzut be admitted. 13 In Grm v Gm A" 4 the Su-
reme Court reversed a death sentence because the trial court had excluded
earsay evidence that was relevant to the mitigating circumstances 1"
A potential concern with using Rotten Social Background in mitigation is
that it is frequently the case that the victims of capital murder also suffer from
rotten social backgrounds. Given this, it is arguable that allowing defendants to
use this evidence in mitigation is just continuing the cycle of violence in these
environments.' Another thing for defense attorneys to watch out for is the trap
of being too paternalistic. Defense attorneys should be careful to conveyto the
jury that they realize that just because the defendant grew up in poverty or
suffered does not mean that he does not know right from wrong. This type of
paternalism could backfire if there is a juror with a history of Rotten Social
Background, who has turned out to be a law-abiding citizen. To avoid this
problem, the Rotten Social Background evidence should be used solely to show
the subjective state of mind of the defendant at the time of the offense. The
Rotten Social Background evidence should not be used to show general traits, as
syndrome evidence is used, but rather to show what the pariadardefendant was
thinking when he committed the crime. Thus, it is inapposite that a juror who
has experienced a Rotten Social Background nay not have the same criminal
tendency.
IX. Cbnrion
In closing, it should be stressed that Rotten Social Background is not itself
the mitigator. Rather, defendants should introduce evidence of Rotten Social
Background to explain why they are unable to conform to society's legal stan-
dards. Using Rotten Social Background as an excuse defense is impracticable,
because it is nearly impossible to show that, based on his Rotten Social Back-
ground, the defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act. There is
typically no disease of mind, and the cognitive requirement of "knowledge" of
right and wrong will usually be met as well, because despite a rough childhood,
the defendant usually knows that killing is wrong.
Using Rotten Social Background evidence to support the defendant'smitigation case, on the other hand, allows more flexibilityin the type of evidence
133. Id
134. 442 US. 95 (1979).
135. Gn; 442 US. at 97. In Gn the trial court refused to admit testimonial evidence from
a witness that another defendant had confided in the witness that he, and not the defendant on trial
here, had killed the victim Id at %. Defendant sought to admit this evidence to support his
contention that he was not present when the victim was killed, and that he had not participated in
her death, but the court excluded the evidence because it was hearsay. Id The Supreme Court held
that this exclusion constituted a Due Process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at
97.
136. Areneola, su"r note 33, at 708-09.
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permitted. Allowing the defendant to proffer evidence showing that he did not
have the "capacity to conform" his actions to societal norms or that he did not
have the ability to "appreciate the criminality of his actions gives a broader
framework for this evidence to be used. Although Richard Delgado was wrong
(especially in jurisdictions like Virginia, which do not follow the Model Penal
Code's definition of insanity) about the impact of Rotten Social Background
evidence on the guilt/innocence phase of a capital murder trial, his theory fits
perfectly as a statutory mitigator in the sentencing phase under Virginia Code
Section 192-264.4(B)(ii) or (iv). 7
It is important to make the argument subjective and individual to the
pkxtodar defendant. This is one wayto get around the problem of alienating the
potential juror who has suffered from a traumatic childhood and still has become
a productive, law-abiding member of society. The focus must be on the subjec-
tive state of mind of the particular defendant, not on the state of mind of most
people who fit into the group into which the defendant fits. Using Rotten Social
Background as a mitigator is similar to using "syndrome" evidence in that it
requires an extrapolation from the general to the specific. However, the main
difference is that syndromes involve automatic response cases, in which the
defendant tries to show that, because of past traumas, the circumstances sur-
rounding the offense triggered an automatic response, the same as it would in
most people who have suffered the same trauma. In contrast, in using Rotten
Social Background evidence during the sentencing phase, the defendant is merely
trying to show that the childhood traumas he faced made it difficult for him i
pxwiarto appreciate fullythe wrongfulness of his behavior and to conform his
behavior to general social norms.
137. SaDelgado, s"ma note 26, at 55; seealsoVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michi 2000).
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